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Abstract
Programs in quantum gravity often claim that time emerges from fundamentally
timeless physics. In the semiclassical time program time arises only after approx-
imations are taken. Here we ask what justifies taking these approximations and
show that time seems to sneak in when answering this question. This raises the
worry that the approach is either unjustified or circular in deriving time from
no–time.
1 Introduction
Programs in quantum gravity often result in formalisms said to be fundamentally time-
less. Because we observe change, it’s important that these programs recover time from
no-time somehow. One popular idea is that time emerges from fundamentally timeless
physics just as perceived color arises from the fundamentally uncolored world of basic
physics. In the semiclassical time program in canonical quantum gravity, for example,
the idea is that time emerges from fundamentally timeless physics as a result of semi-
classical approximations. Nothing at the fundamental level supposedly plays the "time
role" throughout any solution, but time emerges in the approximately classical sectors of
some solutions.
The comparison with perceived color suggests an obvious worry: circularity. Physically,
color only emerges from uncolored matter diachronically. Color arises from observers like
us interacting with matter across temporal intervals. Replace color with time and the
threat is obvious: if time emerges from no-time but the emergence itself requires time,
then we can’t really say we’ve derived time from no-time. Time emerges if we blur our
vision, but if blurring takes time then time never disappeared.
Here, we raise this concern in a sharp way for the semiclassical time program. Focusing
specifically on the approximations necessary to derive time from no-time, we’ll show that
time implicitly sneaks back in via the physical justifications behind these approximations.
This leaves the program either unjustified in applying the approximations because we are
applying them to timeless solutions, or succeeding only on pains of circularity.
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2 The Problem of Time and Emergence of Semiclassical Time
Quantum gravity seeks to reconcile our best theory of gravity, general relativity, with
our best theory of matter, quantum theory. Many different strategies exist, but here we
focus on the oldest canonical approach, quantum geometrodynamics, and its recovery of
semiclassical time. We chose this program because it has been rigorously developed. We
expect, however, that many of our lessons will generalise.
Canonical approaches employ a Hamiltonian formalism that is then quantized. One
therefore casts general relativity into its Hamiltonian “3+1” form, decomposing spacetime
into leaves of spacelike hypersurfaces. The Hamiltonian framework demands canonical
variables and conjugate momenta. For gravity, the basic variable is the three-dimensional
spatial metric characterizing the spacelike hypersurfaces and the conjugate momentum is
defined in terms of the trace of the spatial three-metric’s extrinsic curvature. In classical
mechanics the Hamiltonian governs the spatial configuration of particles through time;
in classical Hamiltonian general relativity, the Hamiltonian governs the spatial geometry
itself through time. Once put in this form, it is time to quantize.
The counterpart of the quantum state is a functional operating in a configuration space
of spatial three-metrics. To quantize, we turn the variables into operators. Trouble arises
because general relativity is a constrained Hamiltonian system. One of the constraints
is due to the time reparameterization freedom we have in general relativity – we can
slice up or foliate spacetime in many different ways. This constraint, the Hamiltonian
constraint, demands that the Hamiltonian vanish. Making the Hamiltonian an operator
and imposing the constraint yields:
ĤΨ(hab(x), φ) = 0 (1)
i.e., the famous Wheeler-DeWitt (WD) equation, where Ĥ is the Hamiltonian operator
for both gravity and matter, and Ψ is the WD wave-functional depending on the spatial
three-geometries encoded by the spatial metric hab(x) and whatever matter fields we
include, e.g., φ, a massive scalar field.
The core idea of the semiclassical time program is that time emerges if hab(x) is semi-
classical. If not — if hab(x) is quantum — then the concept of time won’t find any
realizer. This idea was expressed by DeWitt (1967) but developed by Banks (1985) in
the canonical approach.1 The WD wave-functional is, at the fundamental level, utterly
timeless. Nonetheless it describes patterns of correlations, just like a checkered shirt at
an instant contains a spatial pattern of correlations amongst stripes and colors. In the
semiclassical interpretation, the idea is that at a certain level of approximation, a pattern
of correlations “looks” temporal, just as a checkered shirt can look solidly colored if one
zooms out far enough.
1See Kiefer 2004, Anderson 2007 and references therein.
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By “looks temporal” we mean that a parameter plays the time role. While defining the
time role could become quite messy and philosophical, this program adopts a very mini-
mal sufficient condition that seems plausible, namely, that something plays the time role
if it behaves as “t” does in the ordinary time-dependent Schrödinger equation (TDSE).
In other words, if the matter fields depend on (or vary with) some parameter in the same
way as they do on “t” in the TDSE, that warrants calling that parameter time.
Herein lies the key achievement of the semiclassical time program: given suitable
approximations, they show that the non-temporal gravitational fields hab can play the role
of time in a functional Schrödinger equation for the matter fields φ. If one approximates
from the WD equation appropriately, it looks like matter is evolving with respect to
time (a la a Schrödinger equation) against a classical gravitational curved spacetime
background (described by the semiclassical Einstein-Hamilton-Jacobi equation).
Let us now turn to the actual derivation of time and the functional Schrödinger equa-
tion. Here we loosely follow a presentation by Derakhshani (2018). The derivation has
two crucial steps. One, it uses a Born-Oppenheimer approximation to motivate writing
the wave-functional of the universe in product form. Two, it employs a WKB approx-
imation on the gravity term in this product. The reader can think of the first move as
separating out a sub-system from the total system. The second move then shows that
when that sub-system behaves approximately classically, it can function as a clock for
the rest of the system.
Suppose we have a wave-functional that satisfies the WD equation and other necessary
constraints. This describes a static wave in a high-dimensional configuration space. How
do we get time?
To begin, notice that we don’t expect quantum gravitational effects except near the
Planck scale. Since hab depends on the extremely small Planck mass mp, the idea of
separating scales via a Born-Oppenheimer (BO) approximation is natural. Hence we can
separate the “heavy” part of the wave-function, χ(hab) from the “light” part, ψ(φ, hab):
Ψ ≈ χ(hab)ψ(φ, hab) (2)
The idea is to use the hab degrees of freedom as a clock for the light part φ.
We now apply a WKB approximation, substituting the ansatz AeiS for a wave-





Next, expand S(hab) as a power series in m2p:
S = m2pS0 + S1 +m−2p S2... (4)
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Then, as usual in WKB, we plug S0 and S1 terms back into the wave equation and
solve. In the ordinary quantum mechanical case, the 0th order terms returns a Hamilton-
Jacobi equation and the 1st order term returns a continuity equation. Essentially the
same happens here. Notably, solving to leading order m2p, we derive a semiclassical
gravitational Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
Take a solution of these equations. Based on experience with geometric optics and
quantum theory, we know it defines in superspace a vector field whose integral curves





where Gabcd is the DeWitt metric, N is the lapse function, Da and Db are the spatial
derivatives, and Na and Nb are shift vectors. One now takes the matter wavefunction










Time emerges in terms of this directional derivative. Call this WKB time.
The final step uses WKB again, keeps only the lowest order terms, and requires a lot





ψ(φ, t;hab) = Ĥm(φ;hab)ψ(φ, t;hab) (7)
where Ĥ is a Hamiltonian-type term and ψ is evaluated at a solution hab, which is itself
a solution of the classical Einstein equations.
Such a compressed derivation may be confusing to unfamiliar readers. The important
take-away here is that the t we used to parametrize the approximately classical general
relativistic solutions (corresponding to the first “heavy” term in our factorization (2)) is
used in a solution as a clock for the matter fields in the WKB regime. The “t” in (7) is
the same as that in (6). We won’t delve into the rest of the theory; however, note that
we can also derive a continuity equation that allows us to use the normal Born rule for
predictions from the theory, and furthermore, using perturbation theory – by considering
higher-order terms we have so far ignored – one can derive non-classical predictions.
In sum, the semiclassical derivation provides an elegant derivation of time from no-
time. Making a series of seemingly reasonable assumptions, a parameter that looks and
acts like time emerges. And if we agree that something that looks and acts like time is
time, then time emerges.
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3 Justifying the Approximations
We jumped from one equation to another by expanding to leading order, focusing on
lowest order, assuming the wave-functional approximately factorises, and so on. What
justifies these steps? Approximations require physical justification. At the level of pure
math, one can “derive” virtually any equation from any other if one is allowed to assume
anything. It makes no sense to say that one equation or quantity is “close” to another
absent a metric. We need a justification, and it is in this physical justification that we
fear time sneaks in.
To elaborate, we can treat a classical pendulum as approximately an undamped har-
monic oscillator. That is because, for small angles, sin θ ≈ θ, which allows us to derive an
equation of motion for the pendulum that is the same as that of the harmonic oscillator.
A harmonic oscillator, we might say, “emerges” from the pendulum in the small angle
limit. But relative to some measurement standard, at some point an initial displacement
angle becomes too big and the approximation fails; that is, we notice deviations from
the derived equation of motion. Angles aren’t intrinsically big or small. They are big
or small relative to a standard. Typically that standard refers to the observational or
measurement capacities of an observer. The validity of the approximation hangs partly
on an error analysis of our measurement technique. Coarse measurements will allow the
approximation to be good for greater values of θ than finer measurements.
This example suggests a subtle problem for the semiclassical time program and even the
present analysis. We have no observers yet in canonical quantum gravity. We are working
in a partially interpreted theory, one lacking a solution to the infamous measurement
problem. Absent observers, we cannot perform the above error analysis. When are (say)
off-diagonal terms in a matrix “small” and justifiably ignored? The answer is: when
they’re irrelevant to the observer (measurement, analysis, etc). However, to introduce
an observer in order to have a standard for judging small, we effectively need to already
have a time. Observation is a temporal process, after all. So we can only justify an
approximation by already introducing a time, making the derivation circular. And minus
an observer, we can’t say what “looks” like a small difference that would warrant an
approximation.
We return to this point later, but for now we’ll keep things simple by pointing out
that the approximations used to derive semiclassical time are always warranted in the
rest of physics by appeal to an implicit time metric. Without the time metric, the
approximations seem physically unwarranted. We do not, and cannot, show that there
is no standard possible that would warrant the approximations. What we can do is raise
the worry and challenge the advocate of semiclassical time to justify the approximations
without appealing to a prior time standard. We’ll see that some assumptions that initially
appear innocent of temporal assumptions are, in fact, not.
Although the semiclassical time program has an estimated twenty assumptions (Ander-
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son 2007), we’ll concentrate on three: the Born Oppenheimer approximation, the WKB
approximation, and decoherence.
3.1 The Born-Oppenheimer Approximation
The BO approximation in the semiclassical time program splits the universe into two
kinds of subsystem, the gravitational field h and the quantum matter fields φ. The justi-
fication for this split ultimately appeals to a difference in masses: the masses associated
with h are ‘heavy’ in comparison to the masses associated with φ.2 Therefore it seems
plausible that h is largely insensitive to φ. By contrast, φ, being small and light, is sen-
sitive to the big and heavy h. We can therefore assume that the wave-functional Ψ for
the entire system (the universe) can be approximately factorized into two wave-functions
χ(h) and ψ(φ, h), with χ associated with the heavier h, and ψ associated with the lighter
φ but also h, as in (3) above. This factorization, as we’ve seen, is a necessary assumption
in the derivation above.
On its face the rationale doesn’t sneak time into the derivation. Some masses are larger
than others, and we expand accordingly. That’s it.
Let’s probe deeper. The BO approximation is motivated by appealing to the “very
different scales” (Kiefer 2004, 164) that the gravitational fields and matter fields have.
This appeals to a metric that measures how big the effects of one subsystem are on
the other. Why does having different size masses warrant different scales and such a
factorization of the wavefunction? Differences in the values of other properties (say,
charge) don’t always demand or legitimize such an approximation. What is special about
mass?
To help answer this question let’s look at standard uses of the BO approximation
outside quantum gravity. Unfortunately we’ll find that mass and size scale differences
between systems are only relevant for the BO approximation because they are proxies
for timescale differences in the dynamics of the relevant subsystems.
In its most popular application – molecular and atomic physics – the BO approxi-
mation is used to factorize an atom or molecule’s wave-function into the product of two
subsystems. Here, the heavier subsystem is the nuclei, and the lighter subsystem is the
electrons surrounding the nuclei (Griffiths 2005). Again, the heavier system is assumed to
be effectively independent of the lighter system, while the lighter system rapidly adapts
itself to changes in the heavier system. The usual procedure in these contexts is to pre-
tend that the nuclear wave-function is not changing at all in time, and then calculate
the electronic wave-function associated with that nuclear wave-function. We then find a
more realistic nuclear wave-function by letting it vary ‘slowly’ or ‘sluggishly’, calculating
the possible ranges of electronic wave-functions and hence the mean potentials in which
2See e.g. Banks (1985, 337–338), Kiefer (2004, 165).
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the nuclei can move.
More generally, the BO approximation applies in cases where heavier subsystems are
known to change slowly in time with respect to lighter subsystems. That is why mass mat-
ters. Heavier subsystems have significantly different characteristic dynamical timescales
– timescales over which “the parameters of the system change appreciably” – with re-
spect to lighter subsystems, and can be said to be adiabatic with respect to the lighter
subsystem. The change in the lighter subsystem happens on such a short timescale that
there isn’t enough time for the heavier subsystem to react in that relevant timescale, and
so it is effectively independent of lighter subsystems in that period of time. The BO
approximation is thoroughly laden with temporal notions.
Returning to the semiclassical time program, we have a problem. Because the BO
approximation is so widely and successfully used, and because it initially seems to be
about mass (not time!), it may be imported into derivations without considering whether
the conditions warrant its use in a new application. Did that happen here? We cannot
say, but we can leave this section with a dilemma: either the mass scales relevant here
are proxies for time scales or not. If they are then we face circularity; if they are not,
then we have no clear means of assessing whether BO is even applicable in this situation.
In short, this seems to be a case of needing time to get time, but of course, in canonical
quantum gravity we have no time for that.
3.2 The WKB Approximation
The WKB approximation is a staple of every quantum mechanics course. Because it is
often presented as a piece of pure math, this makes WKB seem like a mere approximation
method in the theory of partial differential equations, an unlikely place to find a hidden
time preference. But of course, we still need physical justifications for why this math
applies to a given physical situation. For that we need physics.
Frequently, we use WKB when working with stationary states of energy E > V .
We note that right away the time dependence is therefore hidden. If a system be-
gins in an energy eigenstate, then time evolution simply multiplies the state by a time-
dependent phase factor that does not affect the probabilities for measurement. Perhaps
we shouldn’t think this way: here, the time-independent equation is fundamental and
the time-dependent one is non-fundamental, contrary to ordinary quantum theory.
Still, we believe the approximation does presume the existence of time. We see this
most clearly with the textbook WKB derivation. Begin with the one-dimensional TISE













ψ = 0 (9)
where we use the classical momentum identity:
p(x) =
√
2m(E − V (x)) (10)
If V (x) is constant, then the system behaves like a free particle with ψ(x) ∼ eip(x). If
V (x) varies slowly, then we expect that the system behaves approximately like a free
particle. Motivated by this thought, we look for solutions to the TISE of the form
ψ(x) = A(x)eiS(x)/h̄ (11)






















Everything so far is exact. However, it is important to note that (12) generally does
not have analytic solutions. What then? The solution, and a crucial step in the WKB
approximation, is to assume that A varies so slowly with respect to x that d2A
dx2
≈ 0.
This step allows us to solve (12) and (13) for A and S. Combining these results, we











where C is some real constant dependent on A and S. Arbitrary superpositions of these
wave-functions are approximate solutions of the Schrödinger equation. They are also
exact solutions of the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation — from which one obtains the
time parameter used in the semiclassical time program.
Under what conditions are we allowed to neglect d2A
dx2
? This is where the physics enters.
The answer is well-known: V must vary slowly with x and (E − V ) can’t be too small.
When V is constant, and the system behaves like a free particle, A is constant. When V
is ‘close to constant’, i.e. varying slowly, so too is A.
On its face the condition of V “slowly varying” does not conceal any time-dependence
since it concerns slowness with respect to the spatial x not the temporal t. What mo-
tivates WKB is that when the potential is not too spatially sharp one tends to not
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see much interference, so this important assumption is about spatial smoothness not
temporal variation.
Still, time is very much present. There are probably many ways to see this. An obvious
one is to consider the use of the classical momentum identity (10) here. In quantum
mechanics, we know that the momentum operator depends only on spatial variables and
not time:
p̂ = −ih∇ (15)




In the above derivation, despite working in quantum mechanics, we have used the classical
momentum identity without explanation. This lets us adopt the energy condition, E > V
not being too small (and E 6= V ), to physically justify neglecting d2A
dx2
. But why are we
considering E > V ? The time dependence of (10) lets us see why. Combining (10) and





2m(E − V (x))
(17)
Now we see why E > V is the relevant condition for WKB. For any fixed potential
V (x), the integral on the right hand side is small when E − V (x) is large. As a result,
the total time ∆t =
∫
dt spent by a system in that constant potential is very small. On
the contrary, if E − V (x) is not too large (but E 6= V ), then the total time spent under
a fixed V (x) is relatively longer. The longer a particle generally spends time moving in
each given fixed potential, the slower we can say the potential is varying spatially. The
latter fact lets us derive WKB - but notice how the temporal metric is involved in the
actual physical justification.
One might worry that this imports ‘classical bias’ about particles into quantum me-
chanics, but we can see essentially the same point from a wave perspective. Note that
if the potential spatially varies slowly with respect to the de Broglie wavelength of the
particle, then the wave-function approximates that of a free particle, i.e., a plane wave.
That means the system will propagate freely with a constant velocity v for a time T . As
Allori and Zanghi (2009, 24) note, that time – the time for which we can pretend that




where L is the scale of the variation of the potential. This provides a clear physical
picture of what it means to apply WKB to begin with. If L is long and v is low, then
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the particle is moving slowly through an effectively unchanging V , allowing WKB to
hold for long times. Conversely, if L is short and v high, then the particle rapidly moves
(in time!) through the potential – in these cases we can no longer assume that V is
effectively constant for the system, and WKB will not hold for long times. This clearly
parallels the classical case we discussed earlier.








The time-dependence, evident when talking about velocities and momenta, becomes
masked when we replace velocities with purely spatial notions of wavelengths and spatial
variations. Yet the time-dependence is plainly still there. From (18) and (19) we can see
that if L is large, the WKB approximation will be good for long T and if small then
only for short T .
In standard cases WKB is thus justified via a background time metric. In the case of
semiclassical time, however, there is no such background time metric, so we again face
our challenge to justify the assumption without invoking time.
3.3 Decoherence
The discerning reader might have noticed two sleights of hand in the derivation of the
functional TDSE and ‘t’. First, in the BO approximation, we effectively assumed that
Ψ was an eigenstate (3) of the WD equation. Since the WD equation is linear, a general
solution involves a superposition of states. Second, a similar assumption was made in our
choice of the approximate WKB wave-function for the gravitational fields χ(hab) in (3).
Again, due to linearity, arbitrary superpositions of states are again also solutions. These
assumptions are absolutely vital for deriving a functional TDSE.3 Using an arbitrary
superposition of states in the BO and WKB approximations, the above procedures do
not recover a semiclassical time.
The most popular response to these observations appeals to decoherence, e.g., Kiefer
(2005, 317). The idea is that if the initial state of the universe is in an arbitrary super-
position of states, then decoherence will drive the wavefunction into a superposition of
effectively non-interacting components, each one of which is suitable for the semiclassical
time recovery. In an Everett-type interpretation of quantum mechanics, for instance, we
could recover a time in each decohered branch or world.
Our worry is especially clear in this case because decoherence is normally understood
as a dynamic process. It presumes temporal evolution by the Schrödinger equation.
Decoherence at once requires time and is required for time. Indeed, one can find tension
in Kiefer’s own account. On the one hand, he writes that “A prerequisite [of decoherence
3See Kuchar 1992.
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in the semiclassical time program] is the validity of the semiclassical approximation...
This brings an approximate time parameter t into play.” (Kiefer 2005, 311) But later he
writes that “Since [decoherence] is a prerequisite for the derivation of the Schrödinger
equation, one might even say that time (the WKB time parameter in the Schrödinger
equation) arises from symmetry breaking [i.e decoherence]... Strictly speaking, the very
concept of time makes sense only after decoherence has occurred.” (Kiefer 2005, 318)
Obviously, the two claims cannot be true at once, and again, we face our dilemma.
4 Discussion
Our investigations into three approximations integral to the semiclassical time approach
have unearthed a general worry: we seem to need to put time in, somewhere and somehow,
in order to get time out of the timeless formalism. This worry hasn’t been noticed before,
we suspect, because time is not blatantly assumed in the derivations. It appears implicitly
via the justifications for the assumptions and not explicitly in the math.
Note that we haven’t shown that there is no possible way to answer our challenge.
If we could make sense of an atemporal observer, perhaps we could find a standard of
measurement that makes the terms ignored in BO, decoherence and WKB in some sense
small. Absent an observer, we can still point out that there is very little to work with
in canonical quantum gravity to help us. This point becomes clearer if we compare our
objection to a similar one leveled against decision-theoretic attempts to derive Born’s
rule in Everettian quantum mechanics.
As is well-known, the Everett interpretation faces a problem in making sense of the
probabilities used in quantum mechanics. Its law consists only of a linear deterministic
wave equation. Therefore it produces only trivial probabilities (0, 1) for any outcome.
Born’s Rule, our guide to experiment, seems unexplained. In response, one school of Ev-
erettian thought turns to decision theory. The idea is to prove that a rational Everettian
agent will set her preferences in accordance with Born’s Rule. Controversy ensues about
whether the assumptions used in the proofs are really requirements of rationality.
But there is another line of criticism that will immediately sound familiar. Baker
(2007), Kent (2010) and Zurek (2005) all point out that Everettians use decoherence to
say that different “worlds” approximately emerge from the wave-function. What does
“approximately” mean here? Well, it seems to mean that a branching structure is likely
to happen, i.e., that the probability of an error is small according to the Born measure
(mod-squared amplitude). Yet all the decision theoretic proofs begin with a branching
structure. That begs the question, the critics say, for we’ve assumed that mod-squared
amplitude is a probability in our demonstration that mod-squared amplitude is proba-
bility.
Structurally this objection is very similar to ours. Can any replies in the probability
case be transferred to the present one?
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The only Everettian response that we were able to find is Wallace (2012, 253–4). As we
understand him, Wallace argues that the branching structure “really is robustly present”
even prior to the interpretation of mod-squared amplitude as probability. What standard
makes it present? His answer: Hilbert space norm. This is an objective physical measure.
If branching emerges approximately with respect to Hilbert norm, then the probability
measure is not needed as an assumption in the derivation of Born’s rule. One could fairly
ask whether Hilbert space norm is really enough to answer the objection. Small differences
in Hilbert space norm may not be small differences for an observer, or vice versa. From
color science we know that similar-looking colors (with small phenomenological distance)
might be produced by physically dissimilar properties. The Hilbert space norm might
not be enough for Wallace to fully answer the charge.
However that debate gets resolved, we note that we lack anything like Hilbert space
norm in the present case. The space of all spatial three-metrics has a geometry given
by the DeWitt metric. But this metric won’t tell us how far quantum states are from
one another. What we would need, comparable to the Hilbert norm, is an invariant
positive-definite inner product on the space of solutions of WD. Here we’re right back to
time! “Invariant” means that the inner product is independent of time. Constructing an
invariant positive-definite inner product on the solution space of the WD equation is the
notorious “Hilbert space problem” (Kuchar 1992). Whereas the Schrödinger equation
brings “for free” a nice conserved inner product, WD does not. The most natural way
to solve the Hilbert space problem is to identify a time variable and construct a norm
from that; but in this context that won’t help.
Again, we don’t want to say that there is no way to warrant the approximations. But
we have shown that the most natural warrant – the warrant found hidden throughout
the use of our assumptions – is temporal. We see no reason to think the introduction of
observers will change that verdict.
5 Conclusion
We started with the core idea that the world was fundamentally timeless: semiclassi-
cal time arises from certain regimes looking temporal when we blur our vision. That
metaphor turns out to be not quite right, as it neglects that we’ve imported a mathe-
matical construct, the Hamilton-Jacobi structure, onto the basic physics and only within
that structure does something naturally corresponding to time emerge. Instead of blurry
vision making a pattern of correlations in the wave-functions look temporal, what’s really
happened is that we’re being offered “time glasses.” We are told that you’re justified in
using these glasses – this mathematical construct – and when we look through them,
they turn the pattern temporal. Are we justified in wearing “time glasses”? At present,
it seems that the only reason to wear them is when one already has time.
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